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Abstract
In this contribution, I trace the ways practicing judges articulate, as well as challenge,
race. Drawing on an ethnography of everyday practices of adjudication and sentencing in
a Dutch, lower Criminal Court, and working with Stuart Hall’s conception of articula-
tion, I show how judges draw on three articulations of race – that of culture, the social
milieu, and the phenotype – to make sense of individual cases. Emphasizing how and
where these articulations of race serve local, pragmatic goals – of individualized sen-
tencing, or of identification of the suspect – I also pay attention to their local imprac-
ticalities, that is, where these registers are challenged or resisted. In so doing, I do not
only understand race as multiple but also situate race as a pragmatic and local accom-
plishment with its own uses and instabilities.
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Judging with ‘Difference’
‘To treat like cases alike’: this surely is modern law’s most worthy and commendable
goal. Its realization, however, has proven elusive. Scholars working within Critical Race
Theory have pointed to the ways in which the law is a powerful instrument in the
perpetuation and legitimation of racial forms of dominance and oppression. The notion
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of intersectionality, arguably the most well-known notion to come out of critical race
theory, underlines the importance of apprehending interlocking forms of oppression
(race, gender, class, and so on) in relation to each other, as legal categories tend to
disassociate certain protected classes of individuals from wider social contexts and
disaggregate the individual into separate identities (Crenshaw, 1989; Delgado, Stefancic
and Harris, 2012; Razack, 1994). Critical legal scholars, then, have made important
strides toward understanding how inequalities structure access to and treatment by the
law, how legal forms of understanding and narrating reality silence or gloss over racial
inequalities (Razack, 2000), and how the very notion of a liberal (autonomous, isolated)
subject is itself a racialized fabrication (Eze, 1997; Mills, 2017). Meanwhile, statistically
oriented social scientific approaches to racial discrimination in legal practices point to
the continued effects of race on sentencing outcomes (see e.g. Lammy, 2017; Rhodes
et al, 2015; Wermink et al, 2012). Taken together, these various approaches demonstrate
that race persists – even though it too, is frequently an object of disavowal (Bonilla-
Silva, 2006) or active forms of silencing, forgetting, and unknowing (Stoler, 2008;
Vimalassery et al., 2016).
For practicing judges, I learned doing fieldwork among Dutch lower Court judges, the
promise of equality before the law raises problems of a more pragmatic kind. Bringing
into practice the ideal of individualized sentencing (Hutton, 2014), judges aim to account
for and reckon with the unique ‘person of the defendant’ (persoon van de verdachte) and
the unique circumstances of the offense. In that context, the question of equal treatment
becomes an acute pragmatic problem, for how do judges ensure equal treatment in
different cases? What makes a unique person similar to, or different from, the next?
In that context, the promise of equality before the law raises the question what meanings
and consequences judges may attach to what they call ‘differences’ (verschillen).
Emphasizing that they are not ‘stuck in an Ivory Tower’ and ‘in touch with society’,
the judges I encountered liked to emphasize that the courtroom is a space in which they
are confronted with different and at times unfamiliar lives, habits, attitudes, utterances,
and courses of action. ‘We see people from all walks of life, from all cultures, from all
backgrounds’, one judge exclaims, ‘and we try our best to deal with all of that’. Neither
‘difference’ nor ‘diversity’ are neutral descriptors, of course: both evade and suppress
the realities of race both ‘before’ and ‘under’ the law (Coates, 2003). Indeed, upon closer
inspection, this seemingly innocent notion – ‘difference’ between defendants, or
between defendant populations – proved to be pregnant with multiple meanings: judges
tended to refer to ‘different cultures’, ‘different social milieus’, and, in the case of ethnic
descriptors in police reports, simply ‘different looks’. At the same time, these forms of
speaking about ‘difference’ were not without their interruptions, doubts, and hesitations.
‘It’s just, you don’t always know what’s going on’, one judge sighs when commenting on
some defendants’ non-committal, seemingly indifferent demeanor in court, ‘Is it because
of their culture? Or are they just intimidated or scared?’ Or take another judge, reflecting
on a description of the suspect’s appearance as ‘Turkish’: ‘I mean, I sort of have a picture
(beeld) of a typically Turkish man in my head, but I wonder how it got there’.
In this contribution, I unpack this pragmatic category of ‘difference’, shedding light
on the continuing presence of race in judicial sense-making and decision-making prac-
tices. Showing how and where practicing judges order and classify defendants in
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implicitly or explicitly racial terms, I seek to render visible ways of speaking, as well as
not speaking, about race as they take place among practicing judges. In situating my
account in the Netherlands, I aim to contribute especially to accounts of the way judicial
actors, in the absence of an explicit race-discourse, make sense of and articulate race in
their everyday practices of adjudication and sentencing. The Dutch context is especially
instructive in this regard. In the Netherlands, the denial of legacies of colonialism and
slavery is particularly tenacious (Wekker, 2016). Emphasizing its own enlightened and
tolerant character, the Dutch self-conception quite readily projects racism historically,
onto the scene of the Holocaust (‘never again’), spatially, onto the United States (‘racism
is an American problem’), or demographically, onto the lower classes (C¸ankaya and
Mepschen, 2019; Goldberg, 2006; Lentin, 2008; Slootweg et al. 2019). Tracing these
‘afterlives’ of race, then, is not only an attempt to situate the articulation of race within
judicial practices but also a method of writing against the grain of color-blind, Dutch
self-conceptions (see especially Essed and Hoving, 2014; Wekker, 2016).
In the following pages, I first discuss approaches to race in legal contexts. I am
especially concerned with the contrast between approaches that take the object of race
and treat it as an outcome or product of legal forms or practices and approaches that
situate race as something evoked and produced within legal practices. After these the-
oretical notes, I discuss the ethnographic research on which this piece is based and situate
this fieldwork in the Dutch context specifically. Staying with the way judges make sense
of individual defendants with help of three different articulations of race (Hall, 1986),
this study contributes to an understanding of judicial actors as implicated in the produc-
tion and reproduction of (various forms of) race. Indeed, in tracing these articulations of
race – which are also, as I show, partial disavowals of race – I wish to highlight two
dimensions in particular: first, themultiple registers in which racial difference is evoked;
and second, the unstable and suspect character of these registers in judicial practices, that
is, the ways different conceptions can be challenged, undermined, or rearticulated in
court. In so doing I treat race not as a stable presence in these practices but rather as – as
Du Bois suggests – a ‘group of contradictory forces, facts, and tendencies’ (Du Bois,
1940: 67). Then, I move on to a discussion of three commonly used articulations of race:
first, the culturist register, second, the register that highlights the social milieu, and third,
the phenotypical register. Concluding, I argue that we have to emphasize not only on
multiple character of articulations of race in judicial practices but account for their local
instabilities and complexities as well.
Race and the Study of the Law
While space does not permit me to provide an exhaustive account of the various
approaches to race and the study of the law, I wish here nevertheless to draw out two
approaches, showing how the notion of articulation may contribute to the study of legal
actors’ perceptions and accounts of ‘difference’.
In the introduction, I briefly referred to studies of sentencing disparities. These tend to
privilege stable measures of race in its operationalization of difference and generally aim
to gauge whether this variable is correlated with sentencing severity (e.g. Lammy, 2017;
Rhodes et al., 2015; Wermink et al, 2012). Studies of this kind are absolutely crucial to
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demonstrate racial discrimination across the board, yet, as a consequence of their chosen
statistical methods, they do attribute to race the status of a stable attribute or predicate
(see Mascini et al., 2016; Tata, 2007; van Oorschot et al. 2017). In so doing, they
understand race to exist, as it were, ‘before’ the law, as an independent variable. Critical
race theory, however, points out that legal classifications are precisely active in the
production of raced subjects (Coates, 2003). Here, studies of the liberal notion of con-
tract (Mills, 1997, 2017) or legal notions of property (Bhandar, 2014) have made impor-
tant strides toward understanding the implication of the law in forms of oppression and
domination. Race, within these accounts, is recognized to function as a powerful mode to
distinguish between ways of living and ‘include[s] a set of hypothetical premises about
human kinds (e.g. the “great chain of being,” classificatory hierarchies, etc.) and about
differences between them (both mental and physical)’ (Goldberg, 1993). These studies,
emphasizing the role the law plays in the production of race, have been absolutely crucial
in apprehending law as an agent in the making of ‘people and things’ (Pottage and
Mundy, 2004) or indeed the making of people into things. However, accounts such as
these do not necessarily pay attention to the way race is performed into being within
specific legal practices. That is, while they highlight race as a product of legal statutes or
legal notions, the precise ways legal actors confront, evade, and articulate race as part
and parcel of their everyday practices remains largely unaddressed.
Race in Practice, Race as Practice
Fortunately, however, we find a variety of studies that take up the task of studying how
and where race is done as a matter of legal practice that is, the way various sorts of
‘hypothetical premises about human kinds [ . . . ]’ and ‘differences between them’
become articulated in concrete, everyday practices. Razack (1994) for instance suggests
that the courtroom can be thought of as a space in which white, middle-class forms of
demeanor and address are hegemonic, and as such erases raced structures of domination
as these affect the lives and experiences of Aboriginal women in Canada. In understand-
ing ‘difference’ in cultural terms – in this case, the preference for ‘looking people in the
eye’ or evading their gaze – legal actors erase these realities of race, instead drawing on a
cultural explanation that points to other as the divergence from the silent, white norm
(see also Carlin, 2016). Johansen (2019), too, shows how judicial perceptions and inter-
pretations of defendants’ emotions take place in relation to various intersecting identi-
ties, in which defendants of ethnic origin are often thought to display insufficient levels
of humility before the court.
Interaction in court, then, is an important site in which race is articulated. But legal
forms of case-construction may also be crucial to the production of race; take for
instance a study by Bra¨nnstro¨m (2018), which shows that Swedish antidiscrimination
judgment is a practice rife with different conceptions of ‘race’ and ‘ethnic origin’.
Crucially, this study also suggests that neither race nor ethnicity has a stable meaning
to judges, suggesting that race itself is a relational and situated category, mobilized at
some times, and not others. Indeed, these findings resonate with broader approaches to
the question of race that treat race as both historically situated accomplishment. Pro-
cesses of drawing racial boundaries between selves and others may involve intersecting
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social identities (Yuval-Davis, 2010), and social categories may come to overlay others:
think, for instance, of the way the category of religion (especially Islam) has become
vulnerable to racialization in that it has become tied to certain bodies and bodily prac-
tices (and not others) (Meer, 2013). In legal contexts, we can see such slippage between
multiple registers of difference when actors attach raced meanings to (subcultural) forms
of dress such as caps, gold chains, or hoodies (de Casanova and Webb, 2017; Johansen,
2019).
Crucially, race may also be disavowed, hide from view in appeals to color-blindness,
meritocracy, or benign multiculturalism. This disavowal of race realities is, of course,
more generally attended to in concepts like ‘white ignorance’ (Mills, 2017) or ‘white
innocence’ (Wekker, 2016). However, such disavowal may take place in many ways, in
many different sites and settings. Take for instance the way formalized and quantitative
models of risk calculation (of crime, or recidivism) are implicitly, but undeniably,
shaped by racialized fears or anxieties and in which risk itself becomes a proxy for race
(Harcourt, 2010). Or take Hannah-Moffat’s and Maurutto’s (2010) account of the way
Aboriginal offenders’ personal histories of racial violence and oppression are translated
into more neutral and objective appearing risk factors in presentencing reports – a
strategy that renders structural racism invisible and certain racialized realities inacces-
sible. These studies, then, demonstrate how race is enacted in legal practices, and
perhaps especially how it is disavowed or hides from view. For that reason, some have
thought of race as an ‘absent presence’: present precisely in its absence, present because
it does its work in the periphery of vision – like a specter or ghost making its presence
known in indirect, roundabout ways (M’charek et al., 2014; M’charek and van Oorschot,
2019). Drawing on these studies, I wish to unpack the notion of ‘difference’ I encoun-
tered in the field, paying attention in particular to its multiple and unstable character.
Articulating Race in Practice
To do so, I turn to Stuart Hall’s notion of articulation (2018[1980], 1986), which I find
especially useful to draw out not only the relation and contextual production of race but
also its potentially unstable and multiple character. Initially proposed as a way to
attend to address the weakness of Marxist analysis in addressing race – in which
Marxist approaches race tended to be understood as a superstructural function of the
realer relations of production (Hall, 2018[1980]) – the notion of articulation treats race
as a relatively autonomous phenomenon: while it may contribute and work in tandem
with class-based structures of domination, it cannot be reduced to these. For my
purposes here, the notion of articulation is instructive as it draws attention to the
productive and contextual character of race in shaping social relationships. Further-
more, the notion of articulation suggests that the making and doing of race is a matter
of forging linkages between different elements, and what is linked here to produce race
is not necessarily what is linked there. Nor do these linkages produce seamless wholes:
they are not ‘necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time’ (Hall in
Grossberg 1986: 53). As such, the notion of articulation does not quite operate as the
notion of ideology would do: it asks, Hall elucidates, ‘how an ideology discovers its
subject rather than how the subject thinks the necessary and inevitable thought which
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belong to it’ (Hall in Grossberg 1986:53). In that capacity, articulation can be read as a
performative operation (Butler, 1990), in that it produces the entity it is supposedly
‘about’. In the study of race and racialization, this notion productively opens up space
to address the situated character of race-making. Emphasizing processes of attribution
and categorization rather than stable identities, it is especially well suited to apprehend
the way ‘social actors [ . . . ] actively define, differentiate, and create hierarchies
between people’ (C¸ankaya and Mepschen 2019: 628). In that capacity, it can also be
used to emphasize the pragmatic character of articulation: articulations take place to
get something done, for instance, to correctly identify a suspect or to understand and
weigh his or her seemingly noncommittal demeanor in Court. Indeed, if Visweswaran
(1998) argues that the point is not to say that race is socially constructed, but to
describe ‘how it is constructed, that is, understanding the historical conditions which
racial categories are produced and made meaningful’ (p. 77, emphasis added), I would
like to emphasize where and how such articulations serve local, pragmatic goals in
practices of adjudication and sentencing. With this notion in mind, then, it becomes
possible to unpack the notion of ‘difference’ the judges are working with, and to ask:
where and how do what kinds of ‘differences’ become relevant to court actors? How do
judges evaluate, reflect on, contest, negotiate, or disavow these ‘differences’? And
how, in so doing, is race articulated?
Methodological Considerations
This exploration of the different forms ‘difference’ assumes in judicial work practices is
rooted in extensive ethnographic fieldwork in a Dutch lower court. I gained access to the
Court in 2013, after a rather lengthy procedure in which both the court itself and the
Dutch Council for the Judiciary (Raad voor de Rechtspraak) were involved.1 In Spring
2013, then, I started reading case files, conversing with clerks and judges, observing
court sessions, and importantly, started ‘shadowing’ judges (see for shadowing as a
technique also Halliday et al., 2008). This concretely entailed that I read the case files
of the judges’ appointed cases, which cases involved minor cases of petty theft up until
cases of assault and domestic violence; sat next to the judges when they were working on
and with these files prior to the court session; and again sat at the judicial bench (properly
attired in robe and bib) during the court session. In so shadowing 14 judges, I was able to
trace the development and unfolding of roughly 250 court cases from case file to judicial
decision. These case-based conversations usually started out as case-specific discussions
of the case in question but tended to veer off in different directions quite organically,
hence making way for more extensive reflections on various themes. Aside from these
case-based conversations, I also joined a 3-day training course for prospective lower
court judges organized by the court and made it a habit to socialize with various members
of the court – administrative personnel, clerks, and judges – over lunch in the Court’s
cafeteria.
The approach taken throughout this ethnographic project was characterized by a focus
on the practical, ongoing, and situated character of judicial ‘case-making’ (van Oorschot,
2018, see also Scheffer, 2011). Emphasizing that legal work is as much a practice of
navigating sentencing philosophies and reasoning as it is a more mundane practice of
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shuffling documents and talking with defendants, the project aligned itself theoretically
with the idea of social and legal life as an ongoing accomplishment (see e.g. Dupret,
et al., 2015; Garfinkel, 1967; Tata, 2020). It sought to carefully trace the ways judges
make sense of cases and defendants not by assuming a central axis of difference – for
example, by comparing and contrasting cases involving White versus non-White defen-
dants, or defendants ‘from different cultures’ – but rather sought to stay with the ways
judges perceived and constructed cases (van Oorschot 2014, 2018; van Oorschot and
Mascini 2018) as well as ordered cases and individuals as similar or different (see also
Mascini et al., 2016; van Oorschot et al., 2017). As such it was concerned with judges’
‘lay ontologies’ (Durrheim and Dixon, 2000), that is, vernacular understandings of the
way things are and have to be for them to get their job done.
Precisely by staying with these vernacular categorizations, I also came to realize that
while judges at times seemed comfortable commenting on certain ‘differences’ in
appearance, or in terms of defendants’ ‘cultural backgrounds’, I also encountered limits
to their readiness and ability to speak about ‘difference’. Some of my follow-up ques-
tions, for instance, seemed to run up against not only a professional self-conception of
neutrality (‘I don’t comment on these kinds of speculations’) but were also met with
embarrassment and discomfort. I realize that my role as a researcher may have contrib-
uted to this unease; at the same time, this unease contrasted sharply with the judges’
overall readiness to discuss their work with me, so I tend to believe it was specific to the
subject matter of ‘difference’. Of course, such affects are acutely informative; not
necessarily because they are suggestive, perhaps, of well-kept secrets the researcher
may then reveal but rather because they point to the presence of pressing ambiguities
and unresolved tensions (Boersma, 2019; C¸ankaya and Mepschen, 2019). Tracing their
articulations of race, then, is to include into these articulations the possibility that certain
things may pointedly not be said or go without saying. Indeed, Stoler alerts us to forms of
aphasia – an inability to speak, find a language – that are so characteristics of colonial
forms of knowing and speaking (2016). Moreover, these affects may be accounted for in
part, too, by the fact that the judges I grew familiar with over time do justice against a
societal background characterized by ongoing debates over citizenship, Dutchness, and
cultural, religious, or ethnic Others (see e.g. Mepschen et al., 2010; van Reekum, 2014;
Wekker, 2016), as well as against a background of emerging debates about discrimina-
tion in practices of police surveillance and investigation (C¸ankaya, 2015; Rodrigues and
van der Woude, 2016). Meanwhile, the judiciary itself remains predominantly made up
of ‘autochthons’ or Dutch native borns, which predominance was reflected in the com-
position of the group of judges I worked with. These societal debates hit close to home
when, in 2012, the Dutch Jurists’ Magazine published a controversial study suggesting
that lower court judges punish ‘foreign looking’ defendants more harshly than Dutch-
looking defendants (Wermink et al., 2012). As my fieldwork took place during the
aftermath of the aforementioned, highly publicized study into sentencing disparities
between foreign-looking and Dutch-looking defendants, this piece can be read as doc-
umenting a historical moment in which ‘difference’ became a particularly pressing and
troubling matter of concern to judges, as well as a more general attempt to trace the
afterlives of race in a postcolonial setting characterized by specific forms of forgetting
and unknowing.
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On Moroccan Confessions and Angry Antilleans: Race-as-Culture
The first salient register judges draw on to make sense of ‘difference’ is the culturist
register. Throughout my fieldwork, judges would quite readily and comfortably speak of
cultural differences as factors they need to ‘take into account’ when they speak with
individual defendants. They tended also to map ‘different cultures’ onto different ethnic
groups, especially the Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, or Antillean minorities in the
Netherlands (the first two minorities tend to have a labor migration history in the 1960s
and 1970s, while the last two groups have migrated to the Netherlands from the former
colonies Surinam and the Dutch Antilles Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao). ‘Culture’, to
judges, functions as a way of accounting for and understanding communicational ‘dif-
ferences’ in court and defendants’ ‘process attitude’ [proceshouding] more generally.
Turkish and Moroccan defendants, for instance, tend to be understood to be especially
concerned with a sense of ‘honor’. This sense of honor, judges point out, translates in
court into forms of equivocation, that is: speaking in half-truths or moving between
partial confessions and demonstrations of their innocence. To judge Laney, defendant
Jalal’s ‘process attitude’ [proceshouding] is a case in point. This defendant had been
accused of criminally insulting a police officer (a punishable offense in the Netherlands).
A brief excerpt from my field notes is suggestive of defendant Jalal’s ‘equivocations’,
but also, and especially perhaps, of judge Laney’s growing irritation with the defendant’s
words:
Judge Laney: So, have you indeed insulted this police officer?
Defendant Jalal: Well what can I say? It was all very stupid.
JL: You’d been drinking, right?
DJ: Yeah, I had a few. And those cops were just messing with me, getting up in my face . . .
JL interrupts: And does that happen more often?
DJ: No, not at all.
JL: Yes it does. I see you’ve been sentenced for an insult just like this before, have you not?
DJ, confused: well, that’s in the past, isn’t it . . .
Having discussed his personal circumstances, defendant Jalal is given the chance to
address the judge one more time – standard procedure in Dutch Courts. There, he again
points to the police officials’ confrontational demeanor:
DJ: So I’ve got to be honest, I’ve been stupid. But those cops were really bullying me. And
they’ve told their little story and I haven’t even been able to tell mine. It was just stupid. I
wanted to say sorry but that one cop isn’t here today. And they’ve really made use of the fact
I was drunk, just so they can charge me a fine.
Judges tend to be impatient with such demonstrations of equivocation; indeed,
research on juvenile delinquents suggests that legal actors in the Netherlands feel better
equipped to deal with a direct challenge to their authority – perceived as egalitarian and
native ‘Dutch’ – than with what they perceive to be Moroccan and Turkish defendants’
more vacillating narratives and listless presence in court (Weenink, 2009). Another way
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in which Turkish and Moroccan culture informs their ‘process attitude’, judges explain,
is in defendants’ attempts to deny the charges, even in cases with a wealth of condemn-
ing evidence: ‘He knows he did it, I know he knows he did it, but he’s never going to say
he did it’, one judge explains. It is in this register that a particular joke I heard a few times
starts to make sense:
Question: What is a ‘Moroccan confession’?
Answer: It’s when a Moroccan defendant doesn’t file for appeal immediately after your
verdict!
Suggesting that Moroccan defendants only express their guilt by not filing for appeal,
this joke highlights the taken-for-granted notion that Moroccan defendants are particu-
larly prone to deny the charges, no matter the evidence.
Other minority defendants are seen somewhat differently. If Moroccan and Turkish
defendants are seen as evasive and prone to equivocate, defendants from the Dutch
Antilles may be conceived as aggressive when they offer a counter narrative to that of
the public prosecution or challenge the alleged facts, leading Judge Peters for instance to
correct a defendant’s demeanor saying that ‘I am the boss here, you understand?’ Hindu-
stan defendants, meanwhile, are usually understood to be overtly formal and deferential
to the court: ‘They dress well, in their best clothes, suit and tie [jasje, dasje], “Yes Sir, no
Sir”‘, Judge Fielding characterizes their demeanor. It is a deference, however, that may
lead them to be perceived as inauthentic and hard to ‘read’ – a problem for judges, as
they are interested, too, in the way individuals see themselves and their own actions,
especially in the light of the question whether the defendant is sufficiently and authenti-
cally remorseful (see Rossmanith et al., 2018; van Oorschot et al., 2017).
As these observations show, culture is here understood to function as a cognitive and
behavioral schema informing the way people feel, act, and speak. These ways of feeling,
speaking, and acting can be contrasted with a silent norm of Dutch, native demeanor that
emphasizes frank, direct communication (not: equivocation or inauthentic deference)
and a healthy anti-authoritarian spirit (but not: aggression). Culture, to judges, is more-
over something that individuals carry with them, wherever they go, and is ‘expressed’ in
Court as a matter of defendants’ ‘process attitude’. Not only do these notions resonate
with broader notions of Dutch identity as shaped by egalitarian, frank communication
(‘we say it like it is’, see especially van Reekum, 2014), but they are also informed by a
variety of social scientific knowledges. Indeed, I was to learn that judges have the option
to attend post-vocational training days in which they are taught about ethnic minorities in
the law.2 These courses, titled ‘Turkish and Moroccan People in the Practice of Law’ and
‘Antillean and Surinamese People in the Practice of Law’, draw on a wide variety of
criminological and social–psychological knowledges that suggest that certain forms of
deviance (honor related violence) as well as certain forms of interaction (especially
evasive behavior) are to be understood as rooted in offender’s ‘culture’ (see Studiecen-
trum Rechtspleging, 2012a, 2012b). Moreover, one of the pieces in the course literature –
the book ‘Moroccan Sweethearts’ by cultural anthropologist Werdmo¨lder (2005) –
explicitly understands culture as ‘collective mental programming’ (p. 56) and gives
voice to the suggestion that ‘the only thing they [Moroccan youth] really understand
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is a repressive approach’ (p. 36), not the supposed ‘typically Dutch’ emphasis on reha-
bilitation. It goes without saying that this account of ‘their culture’ is pretty damning: not
only does it seem to elide the possibility that a Moroccan defendant really didn’t do it. It
also understands emotions such as upset, confusion, or anger as direct expressions of
culture, in so doing not only erasing the possibility of agency but also attaching punitive
consequences to such forms of communication in court.
Precisely in this capacity, this notion of culture is one way to articulate race. Account-
ing for and explaining observed ‘differences’, the notion of cultures operates in precisely
the same way as race may once have done. Supposedly immutable, rooted somewhere
inside the individual, culture assumes the tenacity and durability of 19th-century con-
ceptions of race, which similarly treated individual tendencies as expressions not as born
out of the freedom of a (white) liberal subject endowed with moral reason (see Eze,
1997) but rather as the nonvoluntary expression of certain passions and instincts. In
precisely this sense, culture is not a move away from race but rather an articulation
of it (Visweswaran, 1998). It is important to situate this articulation of race more
specifically in a Western context, within which culture became an increasingly dominant
register in which to articulate race (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991, but see also Durrheim
and Dixon, 2000). In the practices of these judges, this articulation of race allows them to
make sense of defendants’ ‘process attitude’ – but as we will see, only up to a point.
Indeed, while this culturist register resonates with a wider social context, judges do in
fact display significant measure of discomfort with these culturist notions. The joke
about Moroccan confession was related to me with a mirth that was almost defensive;
defensive, even though ‘this is how we experience it’, judges also know very well that
they cannot assume guilt from the start. Crucially, however, the notion of culture is also
awkwardly positioned vis-a`-vis the emphasis judges place on individualized sentencing
(Hutton, 2014), that is the attempt to ‘tailor’ their sentences to the unique ‘circum-
stances’ and ‘person’ of the defendant. Culture, within this specific problematic, assumes
a double role: on the one hand, culture offers itself up as a means by which to cater a
sentence to an individual, for instance when it is suggested that rehabilitative options are
not suitable for a Moroccan defendant, or when judges feel the defendants’ ‘culture’
excuses his or her equivocating behavior in court. At the same time, judges express
discomfort with this register as well: ‘You always have to be careful not to lose sight of
the individual behind the culture’, one judge comments, and different styles of commu-
nication in court may also be a consequence of unfamiliarity with courtroom procedure
or emotions. To iterate the words of one judge: ‘You don’t always know what is going
on’. Culture, then, is both a lens onto the defendant – a tool to see him more clearly – but
also something that may conceal his or her real ‘person’. Culture-as-race, then, functions
both as a lens and a veil (see Mitchell, 2012).
Secondly, judges may also contest this culturist register in cases where the realities of
discrimination and racism are too difficult to avoid. Especially when it concerns cases of
fraught or escalating interactions between defendants and police officers (e.g. disorderly
conduct or assault of a police officer), judges tend to have eye for the lived experience of
racial profiling and the situational dynamics of escalating interactions between police
officers and defendants. Commenting on a case much like Jalal’s, Judge Starr for
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instance zoom in on tensions between ethnic minority youth and police officers rooted in
ethnic policing practices:
‘Well, the bigger issue that plays a role here is also of course the fact that many Moroccans
feel they’re treated badly by the police. Meanwhile we know the police does in fact seek out
certain groups, people with a bit of a color.’
Indeed, other judges too may point to these lived realities of marginalization and
persecution, often in connection to, or in explicit contrast with, the issue of ‘cultural
diversity’. Here, judges echo more recent concerns with ethnic profiling (see e.g. C¸an-
kaya, 2015; Rodrigues and van der Woude, 2016), explicitly contesting the culture
concept and its use in explaining crime. On the one hand, then, race is articulated and
solidified with the help of a culturist register, in which individual defendants come into
the court culturally programmed, as it were. On the other, this register is not necessarily
all encompassing or stable: it can only imperfectly evade certain racial realities (of racial
profiling, for instance), nor does the appeal to culture necessarily help judges get a ‘clear
picture’ of the individual defendant. Culture, however, is not the only articulation of
race.
‘Problems in All Areas of Life’: Race-as-Milieu
A second, prevalent way of understanding – and contesting – ‘difference’ is in the
register of the milieu. This milieu-talk is evident in the way judges comment on indi-
vidual defendants as well as on the ‘kind of people’ they deal with in their everyday
practices. Indeed, the individual defendant is often conceived as a member of a kind or
type (van Oorschot et al., 2017; Tata, 2007). Take for instance Judge Peters comments on
a drug-addicted defendant: ‘Types like this, they’re just permanently stoned. They use it
[marihuana] in their morning cigarette’. Or take Judge Masons commenting on a case of
domestic violence by stating that ‘had my husband hit me, I’d be in my car, crying of
course, but on my way to never come back. But it’s different for certain kinds of people.
Some are just used to people being hit around you’. In this context, the notion of the
social milieu provides these judges with a helpful cognitive shorthand to understand and
account for these differences. ‘Looking at these cases you can’t escape the impression
that some people are from such a different milieu’, one judge relates to the researcher.
Tracing the way this milieu concept operates in these practices, it becomes evident
that it offers judges a particularly flexible way to speak of the relationships between
certain bodies and certain spaces, for example, the marginalized delinquent and certain
urban spaces. However, ‘milieu-talk’ tends to incorporate ideas about people’s lifestyles,
attitudes, and expectations as well. It encompasses a complex of interacting factors.
Judges may point for instance to personality disorders and learning difficulties, low
educational attainments, traumatic migration histories, a lack of employment, living in
impoverished and dilapidated areas, living among people engaged in illicit activity, and
so on. Take for instance Judge Kingsley, who accounts for crime in reference to the
complexity of today’s bureaucratized society as well as people’s social biographies:
van Oorschot 11
‘Our target group has many problems, in the sphere of finances, relationships . . .Often they
have traumatic experiences in their pasts, abuse and so on. [ . . . ] Society is just so complex.
How to survive? Applying for social security, filling in forms, checking policies and
regulations, paying taxes . . . it is just too difficult for people. Often, they can’t read or write.
They’ve got problems in all areas of life.’
This complex of interrelating factors, taken together, produce a certain ‘milieu’. To
judges, this milieu is rather ‘sticky’; if class may be transcended, the milieu more directly
binds people to specific spaces and life trajectories. It understands bodies to be materi-
ally and affectively connected to their material and social environs. In this sense, it is
close to the way Foucault understands the milieu: the milieu is ‘a set of natural givens –
rivers, marshes, hills – and a set of artificial givens – an agglomeration of individuals, of
houses, et cetera. The milieu is a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on
all who live in it’ (Foucault, 2007: 36). Emphasizing the materiality of bodies and their
enmeshing in certain physical and social spaces, Foucault’s conception of the milieu
resonates with the way judges conceive of it. And in this capacity, the milieu is quite
unlike ‘culture’, in that the notion of ‘culture’ assumes a prime mover – people’s cultures
– whereas the notion of the ‘social milieu’ connects a multitude of problems without
necessarily zooming on any one particular cause: in the words of one judges, they have
‘problems in all areas of life’.
I mean, they live in areas where everything is broken, where people around them are also
involved in petty crime, in which it isn’t that strange to deal some drugs for a while or steal
something you’d like to have for yourself,
another judge comments. The milieu, then, is effective and affective: it shapes people’s
purposes in life, as well as their orientation vis-a`-vis property and the good life.
It is important here to note that this notion of the milieu is not, superficially at least, a
racial category; I have heard judges refer to the urban poor in specific marginalized
neighborhoods as constituting a specific ‘milieu’. Zooming in on this notion, however,
demonstrates that it implicates especially specific geographic spaces, specific patterns of
movement, as well as forms of cultural and physical reproduction. Take for instance
Judge Kingsley, who comments on a defendant of Antillean descent. In the following
passage, Judge Kingsley seamlessly switches from a more general understanding of
underprivileged milieus to one that would be specific to Antillean defendants. Pointing
to the parole service report of this specific defendant, he suggests:
Look, [citing from parole service report] ‘limited cognitive ability’ . . .A colleague told me
a few days ago, well, they [the Dutch Antilles] are after all islands, they all sleep with one
another. These are problems rooted in incest [sic].
Drawing together not only structural constraints, personal experiences, but also geo-
graphy and genetics, Judge Kingsley’s understanding of the ‘milieu’ testifies to its raced
character. On the one hand, it locates the source of problematic behavior partially in
today’s complex, bureaucratized society. Yet it also includes an explicit concern with
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geography and genetics, pointing to the influence of descent and biology in shaping
people’s possibilities in life and responses to adversity (‘limited cognitive ability’).
Arguments like these may also be mobilized to connect the practices of endogamy or
cousin marriage found in certain Moroccan-Dutch or Turkish-Dutch communities on the
one hand and mental illness, deviance, and antisocial behavior on the other. There, too,
cultural practices, individual pathologies, and structural constraints work in tandem to
produce a milieu that is difficult to escape.
The point of milieu talk, then, is less to suggest an etiology of crime but rather to point
to its ecology – and the impossibility of neatly separating between structural, genetic, or
temperamental ‘causes’. In that capacity, it can be seen to excavate from history the
relatively fluid, Hippocratic humoralist conceptions of race typical of pre- and early
colonial times. These notions tended to connect ‘climates and constitutions’ (Harrison,
1999), suggesting that human bodies are ‘humorally’, that is affectively, enmeshed
within specific spaces (often understood as climates). Unlike the more static categoriza-
tions that would come to prevail in the 19th century, this humoralist conception of race
treats individual bodies and their tendencies (temperaments) as irreducibly shaped by the
physical environment. In this mode of articulating race, race is not so much a matter of
people sharing a determinative genetic makeup or cultural code but rather emerges at the
interplay of specific humoral types and environments. It is against this background that
the complex of factors hiding in the category of the ‘social milieu’ becomes legible as a
form of articulating race.
Such differences in milieu, to judges, may be of relevance to thinking about the most
desired punishment modality (community service, a fine, or detention) for individual
defendants. Judge Jamison reflects on prisons sentences for those from a specific milieu:
‘Of course, we would balk at our freedoms being stolen from us, but those people are
from a milieu in which people don’t find that all that bad’. Here, this milieu-centered
articulation of race is instrumental in legitimizing punitive sentencing options; after all,
it is not as if these punitive options are experienced as punitive for people from ‘a certain
milieu’. At the same time, this milieu talk is only partially efficacious in getting things
done. The most important problem associated with it, to judges, is the fact that whatever
milieu a defendant may be from, it is also desirable for him or her to ‘take responsibility’
and ‘show remorse’ (van Oorschot et al., 2017; Weisman, 2014). So even though ‘It’s not
right what they do’, Judge Jamison suggests that
it also partially just happens to them. There’s always some reason: people just aren’t that
intelligent, have not had many opportunities in life, or have to struggle to leave their
background behind.
The milieu, then, paradoxically takes away people’s agency – they are a product of a
specific milieu – while it at the same time calls for the taking of responsibility: perhaps
the milieu can be transcended after all. In such cases, judges may opt for a (partially)
conditional sentence, in which one of the conditions may be that defendants follow an
aggression regulation course. In such cases, the court issues an invitation, backed by
force, to ‘take responsibility’ for managing the dysregulated passions of one’s bodies; to
govern, in other words, the self (Rose, 1990).
van Oorschot 13
‘Look, a Hindustan!’: Race-as-Phenotype
A third salient articulation of race in these practices, I suggest, is judges’ routine use of
phenotypical markers in their interpretation of the description of suspects in police
reports. This dimension of legal practices is controversial (Walker, 2003) yet has
received attention mostly as a matter for cognitive psychology (see e.g. work on the
‘cross-race’ effect in witness testimony, Sporer, 2001). These descriptions are important
not only for investigatory actors who may use them as clues in the investigation but also
for judges who may have to judge whether or not a suspect description was sufficiently
specific to warrant certain procedural steps (an arrest or a search, for instance) or the
conclusion that the accused was, in fact, the person a witness or victim identified as being
the offender. A typical example is the following, taken from a process-verbal of a
victim’s account of her assailant’s appearance:
‘Short stature, maybe 1.70 cms
Black puffy jacket with faux-fur hat, sneakers
Dark hair, short, gelled back
Hindustan’
The common use of such phenotypical suspect descriptions raises important political
questions about ethnic profiling; it is not difficult to see how such suspect descriptions,
especially when they start to circulate in society, may further criminalize already mar-
ginalized populations. However, I want to draw attention to the local, pragmatic instabil-
ity of these forms of making differences, and the problems these instabilities raise for
judges and other legal actors.
For one, while this description does not, crucially, describe the suspect’s skin color, it
nevertheless understands difference to be something on and of the body, a matter both of
certain urban-style forms of dress (‘black puffy jacket with faux fur hat’) as well as
ethnicity (‘Hindustan’). As I’ve discussed, the use of ethnic categorizations of appear-
ance is relatively common in the Dutch context, and especially the categories Dutch,
Turkish, Moroccan, Antillean, Surinamese, and Hindustan, both in public debate as in
social scientific research (see Essed and Nimako, 2006; van Reekum 2014). While the
use of such ethnic categorizations is notoriously imprecise, the imprecision of such
categorizations is not necessarily taken to be a problem in this context; in many cases,
legal actors simply assume that witnesses, victims, and police officers categorize people
in similar ways. This articulation of race, then, does not entail substantive ideas of human
behavior but rather takes as its object of legibility and difference the surface of the body.
Crucially, this is not solely or uniquely a matter of the skin – as epidermal definitions of
race would have it (Gilroy, 1998) – but rather of the phenotype. The phenotype, here, is
an assemblage of things and materials on the body, for example, style of hair and
clothing, and points to the body as being from somewhere else, as it being out-of-
place (M’charek, forthcoming). Importantly, this mode of articulating race comes with
its own understanding of how ‘seeing’ and ‘witnessing’ take place: race can be seen at a
glance, and as such has an immediate (unmediated) reality visible to anyone. Of course,
this immediacy and legibility is itself an historically situated accomplishment,
14 Social & Legal Studies 59(5)
contingent upon (post)colonial regimes of knowledge and vision: Gilroy warns that the
seeing and recognition of race requires a trained ‘sensorium’ (1998). This supposed
immediacy and legibility, of course, is attended to most famously by Fanon’s account
of being recognized at a glance as other: ‘Look, a Negro!’ (1986 [1956]).
At the same time, suspect descriptions, articulating race as a matter of the phenotype,
may be treated as precisely that: suspect. For significant anxieties seem to surround their
routine use and production. We find traces of these anxieties in written testimony and the
police officers’ descriptions. Not only are these hardly standardized (descriptions may
variously speak of ‘Turkish appearance’ or ‘Turkish background’) mysterious phrases
like ‘a Turkish expression’ [sic!] also testify to investigatory actors’ unease with their
own use of these categories. Alternatively, police officers may even ask defendants to
describe themselves as a way to go about generating a possible ‘match’ between the
victim’s or witness’ description and that of the suspect himself or herself.3 In their
hesitating formulations, these documents testify to the fragility inherent in the way the
suspect descriptions make relations between the individual (the suspect) and the collec-
tive (the ethnic group) (see M’charek, 2010); they also testify to the awkward and fraught
character of the phenotype as a folding together of certain (sub)cultural preferences as
well as categorizations of bodies according to history and geography (ethnicity) under
the name of a suspect’s ‘appearance’. In that capacity, these documents testify, too, to a
set of anxieties that the colonial archive seeks to suppress but cannot quite escape (Stoler,
2008).
Sometimes, these suspicions with regards to the phenotype raise to the level of the
explicit in court as well. In the case involving the aforementioned suspect description, for
instance, a lawyer successfully contested the victim’s and witness suspect description by
arguing that his client – someone with a Hindustani background – could have been
mistakenly picked out as the culprit, which mistake was all the more plausible as there
were doubtlessly much more people fitting the description in this urban-style night club.
Here, the suspect description was deemed too generic to adequately identify the suspect
(see also Walker, 2003). However, such descriptions may also be challenged as being too
specific. In yet another case, for instance, a suspect description that included the phrase,
‘Turkish appearance’, was contested by the defendants’ lawyer. The police officers
apprehending his client, he argued, had acted on the basis of the suspect’s description
they had received from their colleagues. While this description included various bits and
pieces of information like the length of the defendants’ hair, his stature, and probable
age, the lawyer raised an important question about the non-innocence of visually classi-
fying people on the basis of their appearance: ‘Precisely on the basis of what expertise’,
he asked provocatively, ‘do these police officers categorize my client as Turkish?’ In so
doing, the lawyer complicated the articulation of race as phenotypically legible on and
beyond the surface of the individual body. Evoking the possibility that ‘seeing’ the
phenotype accurately is not a simple or straightforward matter but rather something
rooted in specific forms of expertise (one does wonder what these forms of expertise
may be, though), this lawyer managed to cast doubt on the officer’s decision to stop and
search his client. In this case, this proved a successful strategy: the judge dismissed the
charges, albeit, in his own words, ‘begrudgingly’. On the one hand, then, this form of
seeing the phenotype is taken to be stable enough to merit investigatory action – an
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arrest, a stop and search – while on the other, the instabilities inherent in such forms of
seeing may be evoked to rear their head in court. As such, these contestations of the
phenotype in court demonstrate their inherent instability.
Suspect Presences, Ambiguous Absences: Toward a Sociology
of Ghosts
In the previous pages, I have attempted to trace the multiple character of race as it is
articulated in judicial practices. To sum up, judges regularly use the notion of culture to
understand certain forms of communication or defendants’ ‘process attitudes’; in so
doing, culture is a mode of attributing to certain group fundamental, inalterable differ-
ences in habit and thought that become expressed in and through action. In so doing, this
culture concept operates functionally as race. It also serves local goals, in that it helps
judges to render intelligible certain actions they conceive to be ‘outside the norm’, and as
such – their suggestion – helps them to ‘see’ the individual and tailor their sentence
accordingly. Culture-as-race, then, functions as a lens onto the unique person of the
defendant. At the same time, culture-as-race may also present itself as a screen, standing
between the judge and the defendant, rendering their grasp of the unique defendant more
tenuous (Cf. Mitchell, 2012). Moreover, this understanding of culture may also be
ruptured by an understanding of the often tense and fraught interactions between police
actors and certain minorities, which awareness further destabilized this register of sense-
making. Secondly, the often evoked notion of the ‘social milieu’ is saturated with notes
on geographical isolation, genetic selection, or a cultural penchant for cousin marriage
and endogamy – bringing to the surface a concept of race that excavates, and draws on,
humoral–environmental understandings of the relationships between bodies, places, and
temperaments. On the surface, this notion incorporates references to marginalization and
lived experiences of inequality, yet it remains a politically suspect register, in that it
treats the milieu as a sticky, pervasive force that cannot quite be escaped: just when you
think you are out, it pulls you back in . . .This register, too, also contrasts with the judicial
emphasis placed on ‘taking responsibility’, and in that capacity may be evoked only to be
disavowed immediately: the defendant still has to better himself or herself, still has to
find a way to manage his or her temperament. Last, while phenotypical markers such as a
‘Turkish appearance’ have a common-sense obviousness to many investigatory, prose-
cutorial, and judicial actors and rely on a conception of race as immediately legible on
the body, these markers may also be problematized and contested in Court as being too
specific or too generic. Questions may also be raised about the ‘visual expertise’ nec-
essary to correctly ‘read’ these markers, further underlining the instability of the register
itself – because upon what racialized forms of seeing and witnessing is it based anyway?
As such, these three registers show that race is, as Du Bois has it, indeed a ‘group of
contradictory forces, facts, and tendencies’ (1940). But they also show that these articu-
lations of race serve local, pragmatic goals – to see the individual defendant clearly, to
identify him correctly – and that they come with specific instabilities.
Of course, this account clearly rebuts any self-serving appeals, on the part of judges,
to color-blindness. Even though biological race may not be the first or primary register in
which judges conceive of individual defendants, shades of its biological dimensions
16 Social & Legal Studies 59(5)
persist in their use of the milieu concept, which so readily includes notes on geographic
isolation or a cultural–religious emphasis on endogamy and their genetic consequences.
But race escapes these narrow, biological confines: it is variously articulated as ‘culture’,
and certain styles and forms of dress coproduce certain defendants as, for instance,
‘Turkish-looking’. Precisely in this shape-shifting capacity, race persists. But that does
not mean race always takes the same shape and operates in the same way everywhere.
Articulations take place within specific problematics and settings and draw on specific
histories. The vernacular of the milieu especially is a rather typically Dutch notion, and
its social history remains to be written. In this analysis, it functions as an supposedly
respectable, civilized mode to speak about and understand ‘difference’ (even though
references to incest should give us pause), and in that capacity seems to be particularly
middle-class, Dutch way to situate oneself vis-a`-vis racialized realities of marginaliza-
tion without having to mention or think about discrimination. Last, the use of ethnic
denominators, rather than categories such as ‘Black’ or ‘Hispanic’ in suspect descrip-
tions also distinguishes this practice from others, in which vernaculars about race and
appearance are articulated perhaps more explicitly (although there, too, questions about
the historical situatedness of ‘seeing race at a glance’ remain).
Although the ethnographic character of the data gathered in this project does not lend
itself to drawing solid conclusions about whether these differences exert uniform, overall
influence on sentencing severity, these findings do raise importance questions about
social justice. Given a cultural lens onto both crime and communication in court, do
judges sufficiently entertain the possibility that a Moroccan defendant really didn’t do it?
Indeed, while culture-talk may strike some as relatively benign, its emphasis on culture
as an immutable, fixed characteristic barring truthful communication between judge and
defendant should pause the reader. And are we equipped to recognize and think through
the implications of connecting deviance and crime to the sticky notion of the ‘social
milieu’, with all defeatism that entails not only about people’s capacity for self-
governance and self-improvement but also about the possibility of ameliorating struc-
tural conditions? And is it desirable, given a wider societal context in which crime and
deviance are projected onto ethnic Others, that phenotypical markers feature so often in
suspect descriptions?
Reckoning with Ghosts: A Note on Affects in the Field
Tracing these articulations of race, in my experience, has also been an effort to uncover
those things that are not said, or only said with embarrassment, a sense of anxiety. This is
an observation not only reflective of ‘white innocence’ (Wekker, 2016) but also one that
creates a specific set of methodological challenges as well. That is, it takes a specific
awareness of not only to histories of colonial knowledge production and power but also
requires practically a willingness to allow one’s own interactions with legal actors to
become, or remain uncomfortable, as well as to dwell in that discomfort and allow
oneself to learn from it (Boersma, 2019). Asking judges further questions about what
they understand as ‘differences’ also meant staying with and wading through affects such
as discomfort, embarrassment or perhaps even shame on the side of the judges I worked
with – some of whom felt easily attacked, or some of whom found it difficult to respond
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to recently publicized concerns that they punish certain groups of defendants more
harshly than others. I learned that to stay what difference is and does in these practices
I had to develop a certain methodological sensitivity to what I’ve come to call the ghosts
that haunt a practice. I realized that the promise of equal treatment within a society that is
increasingly understood as becoming ‘super-diverse’ creates a set of anxieties and prob-
lems judges did not always feel equipped to deal with explicitly.4 How, in other words, to
judge with difference is, for judges, an acute and pragmatic question. On a practical level,
the law’s promise of equal treatment continually poses and fails to answer the question:
when is different different enough to merit different treatment? What differences are
allowed to matter? While these concerns may not always rise to the level of explicit
attention, race nevertheless haunts these practices as a question, a calling, and perhaps an
indictment. Both methodologically and conceptually, then, the topic at hand requires an
approach to social life that is sensitive to both jokes and silences, to the said and the
unsaid, to race as a suspect presence and an ambiguous absence.
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Notes
1. The Court and the Council for the Judiciary had few concerns with regard to the content of the
research project (although they did find my ethnographic jargon somewhat ‘vague’) but did at
the beginning express doubts about the feasibility of the project, citing the rather time-intensive
character of the research method I had proposed (ethnography). Emphasizing that my ethno-
graphic focus would be on shadowing, and hence not significantly interrupting, judges’ every-
day work I could fortunately assuage these fears. Of course, all personal data, from clerks, to
judges, to defendants, were and are treated with confidentiality and properly anonymized in
these published materials.
2. Sources in criminal justice tell me that these courses have recently been discontinued and
replaced with courses on multiculturalism and the law. At the time of my fieldwork, they were
still being organized. Back then I explored whether I could attend these as a researcher, but the
organization did not allow me to join in and observe. It cited the importance of judges being
able to frankly discuss these matters as its overriding concern in barring me from attending.
3. Defendants may not readily understand these questions as pertaining to their appearance; in one
case, a defendant answered the question how he would describe himself saying, ‘I don’t know,
I’m usually a nice and quiet person?’.
4. See also (M’charek et al., 2014; M’charek and van Oorschot, 2019) on the notion of hauntology
in relation to race in forensic, DNA phenotyping practices.
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